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## 1. CATCH-22 IN RABUL

State Dept. review completed

Afghan Defense Hinister Abdul Onder has just concluded an official visit to Hoseby where he presumably reviewed the military dituation. Crowing mujabidin strength and a continuing Carling in the size of the Afghan forces argue for Hoseby to increase its own military assistance. The most serious problem conficulty Hoseby, however, may be distillusionment and disloyalty within the Babrak regime. A larger Soviet military presence and role would only intensify these problems.

The latest Afghan Himistry of Defense report available to un on the battle for control of the countryside shows that, in opite of intensive Soviet offensives last spring and summer, the supjahidin now have total control over ton more districts (193 out of a total of 292) than they did at the beginning of 1932. The regime now controls only 72 (25 percent) of the districts and in another 36 districts controls no more than the main town.

The Soviets are known to be concarmed about increasing mujobidin attempth in Rabul and other cities and about the querrilles' growing use of SA-7 missibes. This winter, Chychicin activity has been at least partially responsible for an acute shorthes of POL supplies which has haspared military operations. The POL shorthes reportedly caused the Afghan air force to be grounded in late January. The guerrilles have also cut off the electricity supply in Rabul for most of the past oir weeks.

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neanwhile, the Dabrak regime appears to be crumbling from the inside. Rifts within the ruling party are intensifying. Chalgis are reportedly being removed from astive duty in Dilitary intelligence because of ouspected collusion with the resistance. The Khalgis, in turn, are capitalizing on a major scandal in the noney market involving Soviet advisors and high-level Parchamis to brand those implicated as traitors. Dev divisions within the dominant Parcham faction have appeared as disillusionment with Dabrak and the Soviets grows.

In the military forces, political disaffection is leading to further instances of mutiny and defection. The early January mutiny by 300 soldiers of the 25th division at Khost was followed later in the month by a general reballion of the division's officers. They then joined mujahidin is an attack which cost the division substantial losses. In mid-January, inside bely enabled mujahidin attacking an Alghan commands regiment base mear sabult destroy barracks and oix weapons depots. The regime has been forced to use increasingly entreme measures to replenish its depleted forces with new recruits, indicating that the available reserve is dwindling.

Moscow previously appeared willing to live with a military stand-off to give political politics time to work. The dilemma facing Soviet strategists now is that political decay in Kabul is spreading and may upost the military stalemate.

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